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11 Overview
Social computing encompasses the mechanisms through which people interact with computational systems: crowdsourcing 
systems, ranking and recommendation systems, online prediction markets, citizen science projects, and collaboratively 
edited wikis, to name a few. These systems share the common feature that humans are active participants, making choices 
that determine the input to, and therefore the output of, the system. The output of these systems can be viewed as a joint 
computation between machine and human, and can be richer than what either could produce alone. The term social computing 
is often used as a synonym for several related areas, such as “human computation” and subsets of “collective intelligence”; we 
use it in its broadest sense to encompass all of these things.
Social computing is blossoming into a rich research area of its own, with contributions from diverse disciplines including 
computer science, economics, and other social sciences. The field spans everything from systems research directed at building 
scalable platforms for new social computing applications to HCI research directed towards user interface design, from studies 
of incentive alignment in online applications to behavioral experiments on evaluating the performance of specific systems, and 
from understanding online human social behavior to demonstrating new possibilities of organized social interactions. Yet a 
broad mathematical foundation for social computing is yet to be established, with a plethora of under-explored opportunities for 
mathematical research to impact social computing.
In many fields or subfields, mathematical theories have provided major contributions towards real-world applications. These 
contributions often come in form of mathematical models to address the closely-related problems of analysis—why do 
existing systems exhibit the outcomes they do?—and design—how can systems be engineered to produce better outcomes? 
In computer science, mathematical research led to the development of commonly used practical machine learning methods 
such as boosting [22] and support vector machines [11], public-key cryptography including the RSA protocol [54], widely used 
data structures such as splay trees [56] and techniques like locality-sensitive hashing [40], and more. Well known examples 
in economics include the analysis and design of matching markets [55] that have enabled Kidney Exchanges and have led to 
significant successes in public school admissions and residence matching for doctors and hospitals, the influence of auction 
theory on the design of the FCC spectrum auctions [50], and the design and redesign of the auctions used in online advertising 
markets [21, 61].
As in other fields, there is great potential for mathematical work to influence and shape the future of social computing. 
There is a small literature using mathematical models to analyze and propose design recommendations for social computing 
systems including crowdsourcing markets [3, 13, 26, 29, 35–37, 43, 57, 63–65], prediction markets [1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 23, 47], human 
computation games [41, 62], and user-generated content sites [19, 25, 28, 42]; see, for example, Ghosh [24] for a survey of one 
facet of this work.
However, we are far from having the systematic and principled understanding of the advantages, limitations, and potentials of 
social computing required to match the impact on applications that has occurred in other fields.
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We note that social computing enjoys a close 
relationship with another emerging discipline, which is 
computational social science [30, 48]. But is also distinct 
from that field. While human and social behavior, ability, 
and performance are central to both, computational 
social science focuses primarily on the use of modern 
technology, data, and algorithms to understand and 
describe social interactions in their “natural habitats.” In 
contrast, social computing (as the name suggests) has 
a much more deliberate focus on engineering systems 
that are hybrids of humans and machines, which may 
often entail shaping collective behavior in unfamiliar 
environments. Nevertheless we anticipate a continued 
close relationship and even blurring of the two efforts. As 
an example, one should expect the vast theoretical and 
experimental literature on the diffusion of influence and 
behavior in social networks to be relevant to any effort 
to design a social computing system which relies on 
such dynamics to recruit and engage workers.
In June 2015, we brought together roughly 25 experts 
in related fields to discuss the promise and challenges 
of establishing mathematical foundations for social 
computing. This document captures several of the key 
ideas discussed.
2 Success Stories
We begin by describing some examples in which 
mathematical research has led to innovations in social 
computing.
2.1 Crowdsourced Democracy
YouTube competes with Hollywood as an entertainment 
channel, and also supplements Hollywood by acting as a 
distribution mechanism. Twitter has a similar relationship 
to news media, and Coursera to universities. But 
Washington has no such counterpart; there are no online 
alternatives for making democratic decisions at large 
scale as a society. As opposed to building consensus 
and compromise, public discussion boards often devolve 
into flame wars when dealing with contentious socio-
political issues. This motivates the problem of designing 
systems in which crowds of hundreds, perhaps millions, 
of individuals collaborate together to come to consensus 
on difficult societal issues.
Mathematical research has recently led to new systems 
implementing crowdsourced democracy [32]. This work 
builds upon a body of research in social choice that 
examines how to best take the preferences of multiple 
agents (human or otherwise) and obtain from them a 
social decision or aggregate social preference, typically 
accomplished through some form of voting.1
Consider situations where a highly structured decision 
must be made. Some examples are making budgets, 
assigning water resources, and setting tax rates. 
Goel et al. [32] make significant progress towards 
understanding the “right” mechanisms for such problems. 
One promising candidate is “Knapsack Voting.” Recall 
that in the knapsack problem, a subset of items with 
different values and weights must be placed in a 
knapsack to maximize the total value without exceeding 
the knapsack’s capacity. This captures most budgeting 
processes — the set of chosen budget items must fit 
under a spending limit, while maximizing societal value. 
Goel et al. [32] prove that asking users to compare 
projects in terms of “value for money” or asking them 
to choose an entire budget results in provably better 
properties than using the more traditional approaches 
of approval or rank-choice voting. Inspired by these 
mathematical results, Goel et al. designed a participatory 
budgeting platform that is fast becoming the leader for 
such processes in the U.S.2 For example, this platform 
was recently used to decide how to spend $250,000 of 
infrastructure funds to improve Long Beach (CA) Council 
District 9, and how to allocate $2.4 million of Vallejo CA’s 
capital improvement budget. Looking forward, it is an 
interesting and open research challenge to understand 
if these algorithms and systems yield near-optimal 
1A significant research community concerns itself primarily with computational social choice [6, 7]: this area has particular promise for social 
computing because of the problems of scale that are associated with group decision-making online, such as in crowdsourced democracy. 
2https://pbstanford.org/cambridge/approval
3aggregations of societal preferences, or decisions that 
are near-optimal in terms of overall societal utility.
2.2 Automated Market Makers for Prediction 
Markets
A prediction market is a market in which traders buy 
and sell securities with payments that are contingent on 
the outcome of a future event. For example, a security 
may yield a payment of $1 if a Democrat wins the 2016 
US Presidential election and $0 otherwise. A trader 
who believes that the true probability of a Democrat 
winning the election is p maximizes his expected utility 
by purchasing the security if it is available at a price 
less than $p and selling the security if it is available at a 
price greater than $p. The market price of this security is 
thought to reflect the traders’ collective belief about the 
likelihood of a Democrat winning.
Prediction markets have been shown to produce 
forecasts at least as accurate as other alternatives in a 
wide variety of domains, including politics [5], business 
[12, 58], disease surveillance [52], entertainment [51], and 
beyond [66], and have been widely cited by the press 
during recent elections. However, markets operated 
using traditional mechanisms like continuous double 
auctions (similar to the stock market) often suffer from 
low liquidity. Without liquidity, a market faces a chicken-
and-egg problem: potential traders are dissuaded from 
participating due to lack of counterparties, which 
contributes to an even greater reduction in future 
trading opportunities.
To combat this problem, Hanson [34] proposed the idea 
of operating markets using an automated market maker 
called a market scoring rule. This market maker is an 
algorithmic agent that is always willing to buy or sell 
securities at current market prices that depend on the 
history of trade. Hanson’s ideas build on the extensive 
literature on proper scoring rules [31], payment rules that 
elicit honest predictions from agents. Market scoring 
rules ensure that the market maker has bounded risk 
and that traders are unable to engage in arbitrage. 
Because of these desirable properties, Hanson’s market 
scoring rules have become the prediction market 
implementation of choice used by companies including 
Consensus Point, Inkling, and Augur, and large-scale 
academic projects including SciCast (http://scicast.org) 
and the Good Judgment Project [60].
Recently there has been interest in further tapping 
into the informational efficiency of prediction markets 
and using them to obtain accurate predictions on more 
fine-grained events. For example, instead of viewing a 
Presidential election as having two possible outcomes 
(Democrat wins or Republican wins), we could view it 
as having 250 potential outcomes, with each outcome 
specifying a winner in each U.S. state. Traders could then 
trade securities on events (combinations of outcomes) 
to profit on their unique knowledge, such as whether 
or not the same candidate will win in both Ohio and 
Florida, or whether or not the Republican candidate will 
win in at least one of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
Such a prediction market is called a combinatorial 
prediction market. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of 
keeping prices logically consistent across large outcome 
spaces, running market scoring rules off-the-shelf is 
computationally intractable for many natural examples of 
combinatorial markets [8].
In search of pricing rules that are tractable and preserve 
the logical relationships between security payoffs, 
Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan [1] proposed a general 
framework for the design of efficient automated market 
makers over very large or infinite outcome spaces. They 
took an axiomatic approach, defining a set of formal 
mathematical properties that correspond to economic 
properties that any reasonable market should satisfy 
(such as “no arbitrage” and an “information incorporation” 
property) and fully characterized the set of pricing 
mechanisms that satisfy these properties. Then, using 
techniques from convex analysis, they provided a method 
for designing specific market makers that satisfy these 
properties. The framework enables formal reasoning of 
trade-offs between different economic features of these 
market makers as well as evaluating computational 
efficiency of the pricing algorithms.
This framework is particularly exciting because it offers a 
way to think about approximate pricing in combinatorial 
markets when exact pricing is still intractable. 
Approximate pricing for markets is challenging because 
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approximation errors may be exploited by traders to 
cause the market maker to incur a large or even infinite 
loss. The framework of Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan [1] 
characterizes deviations from exact pricing that won’t 
add additional cost to the market maker. Building upon 
this understanding, Dudík et al.[15] further developed a 
computationally tractable method to run a large-scale 
prediction market that allows participants to trade almost 
any contract they can define over an exponentially large 
outcome space. This method is starting to gain traction 
in industry where it has been used in the PredictWise 
election market [16] and previous and upcoming iterations 
of the Microsoft Prediction Service.3
2.3 Fair Division for the Masses
Social computing systems can be used to help groups of 
people make decisions about their day-to-day lives. One 
particularly innovative example is Spliddit,4 a website 
that provides tools that help groups of people achieve 
fair allocations. Spliddit currently offers tools to allocate 
rooms and divide rent payments among roommates, 
split taxi fares among passengers, assign credit in group 
projects, divide sets of (divisible or indivisible) goods 
among recipients, or split up tasks among collaborators. 
It has been featured in the New York Times5 and had 
tens of thousands of users as of 2014 [33].
Spliddit’s website boasts “indisputable fairness 
guarantees.” Indeed, each of the division mechanisms 
employed on the site stems from the body of research on 
(computational) fair division [53] and comes with provable 
mathematical guarantees. For example, the algorithm 
used for room assignment and rent splitting relies on the 
fact that there always exists an assignment of rooms 
and a corresponding set of prices that is envy-free: every 
roommate prefers the room he is assigned to any other 
room given the prices [59]. Each roommate submits her 
own value for each of the rooms, under the constraint 
that the total value of all rooms matches the total rent 
for the apartment; viewed another way, each roommate 
is essentially submitting a proposed set of prices 
for each room such that she would be equally happy 
obtaining any room at the specified price. The algorithm 
then maximizes the minimum utility (value of room minus 
price) of any roommate subject to the constraint that 
envy-freeness is satisfied. The solution is also Pareto 
efficient, meaning there is no other allocation that would 
increase the utility of any roommate without decreasing 
the utility of another.
As another example, the credit assignment problem 
is solved using an algorithm of de Clippel et al.[14]. 
Each collaborator reports the relative portion of credit 
that he believes should be assigned to each of the 
other collaborators. For example, on a project with 
four collaborators, collaborator A might report that 
collaborators B and C should receive equal credit while D 
should receive twice as much credit. The algorithm takes 
these reports as input and produces a credit assignment 
that is impartial, meaning that an individual’s share of 
credit is independent of his own report, and consensual, 
meaning that if there is a division of credit that agrees 
with all collaborators’ reports then this division is chosen. 
While these conditions may not sound restrictive, de 
Clippel et al. [14] show that they are not simultaneously 
achievable with three collaborators. Their algorithm 
therefore requires at least four.
In addition to providing a useful set of tools, part of 
Spliddit’s mission is to “communicate to the public the 
beauty and value of theoretical research in computer 
science, mathematics, and economics, from an unusual 
perspective.” Indeed, the project has inspired some 
members of the public to take an interest in algorithms 
with provable fairness properties. As one example, a 
representative of one of the largest school districts in 
California approached the Spliddit team about a problem 
he was tasked with solving: fairly allocating unused 
classrooms in public schools to the district’s charter 
schools. This led the Spliddit team, in collaboration with 
the California school district, to design a practical new 
approach to classroom allocation that guarantees envy-
freeness as well as several other desirable properties [46].
3http://prediction.microsoft.com/ 
4http://www.spliddit.org/ 
5http://nyti.ms/1o0TUtO
53 A Challenge Problem: The 
Crowdsourcing Compiler
A concrete challenge problem for future research 
in social computing is what might be called the 
“Crowdsourcing Compiler”:6 the development of high-
level programming languages for specifying large-scale, 
distributed tasks whose solution requires combining 
traditional computational and networking resources with 
volunteer (or paid) human intelligence and contributions. 
The hypothetical compiler would translate an abstract 
program into a more detailed organizational plan for 
machines and people to jointly carry out the desired 
task. In the same way that today’s Java programmer is 
relieved of low-level, machine-specific decisions (such as 
which data to keep in fast registers, and which in main 
memory or disk), the future crowdsourcing programmer 
would specify the goals of their system, and leave many 
of the implementation details to the Crowdsourcing 
Compiler. Such details might include which components 
of the task are best carried out by machine and which 
by human volunteers; whether the human volunteers 
should be incentivized by payment, recognition, or 
entertainment; how their contributions should be 
combined to solve the overall task; and so on. While 
a fully general Crowdsourcing Compiler might well be 
unattainable, significant progress towards it would imply 
a much deeper scientific understanding of crowdsourcing 
than we currently have, which in turn should have 
great engineering benefits. Noteworthy research efforts 
which can be viewed as steps on the path to the 
Crowdsourcing Compiler include Emery Berger’s AutoMan 
Project (http://emeryberger.com/research/automan/)
[4], as well as both academic and commercial efforts 
to automate workflow in crowdsourcing and social 
computing systems (see e.g., http://groups.csail.mit.edu/
uid/turkit/ and http://www.crowdflower.com/).
We note that the organizational schemes in most of the 
successful crowdsourcing examples to date share much 
in common. The tasks to be performed (e.g., building an 
online encyclopedia, labeling images for their content, 
creating a network of website bookmark labels, finding 
surveillance balloons) are obviously parallelizable, and 
furthermore the basic unit of human contribution 
required is extremely small (fix some punctuation, label 
an image, etc.). Furthermore, there is usually very little 
coordination required between the contributions. The 
presence of these commonalities is a source of optimism 
for the Crowdsourcing Compiler — so far, there seems to 
be some shared structure to successful crowdsourcing 
that the compiler might codify. But are such 
commonalities present because they somehow delineate 
fundamental limitations on successful crowdsourcing — 
or is simply because this is the “low-hanging fruit?”
As of today, the Crowdsourcing Compiler is clearly a “blue 
sky” proposal meant more to delineate an ambitious 
research agenda for social computation than it is a guide 
to short-term steps. But we believe that such an agenda 
would both need and drive research on theoretical 
foundations. First steps toward developing the 
mathematical foundations of a Crowdsourcing Compiler 
include formally addressing the following questions:
◗  For a given set of assumptions about the volunteer 
force, and given the nature of the task, what is the 
best scheme for organizing the volunteers and their 
contributions? For instance, is it a “flat” scheme where 
all contributors are equal and their contributions are 
combined in some kind of majority vote fashion? Or is it 
more hierarchical, with proven and expert contributors 
given higher weight and harder subproblems? Which 
of these (or other) schemes should be used under 
what assumptions on the nature of the task and what 
assumptions on the volunteers?
◗  How can we design crowdsourced systems for 
solving tasks that are much more challenging and 
less “transactional” than what we currently see in the 
field — for instance, complex problems where there are 
strong constraints and interdependencies between 
the contributions of different volunteers? Behavioral 
research in recent years has shown that groups of 
humans can indeed excel on such tasks [44, 45], but we 
are far from understanding when and why.
6See http://bit.ly/20juYEX and http://bit.ly/1nIyc3P.
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4 Challenges to Overcome
We have argued that mathematical research has 
the potential to make great contributions to social 
computing. However, before this potential is fully realized, 
there are several challenges that must be addressed.
4.1 Blending Mathematical and Experimental 
Research
Mathematical and experimental research are 
complementary and both are needed to develop relevant 
mathematical foundations for social computing. The 
strengths of mathematical work include:
1.  Mathematical modeling and analysis can be used to 
cleanly formulate and answer many questions about 
system behavior without requiring that we build a 
complete system, providing us with a tool to evaluate 
the impact of design decisions before committing to 
any particular design. For example, such models can 
provide guidance on how to increase participation 
(e.g., comparing a leaderboard to badges [27, 39]), 
predict whether a social computing system will 
achieve critical mass, and perhaps understand 
how the behavior of groups of users change as the 
system scales.
2.  Mathematical guarantees are desirable for properties 
like user privacy (which can be obtained, for example, 
using techniques from the extensive and growing 
literature on differential privacy [18]), correctness 
of a system’s output, or the scalability of a social 
computing system.
3.  Theoretical work in computer science provides tools 
for designing and analyzing new algorithms that 
could lie at the heart of social computing applications, 
answering questions like how to aggregate noisy 
and unstructured estimates or information from 
crowds [36, 43], how to optimally divide a community 
into subgroups, or how to bring people together in 
moments of spare time to achieve a common goal.
4.  Mathematical models can be used to explore counter-
factual analysis, something that is notoriously 
difficult to do through experiments alone.
Needless to say, mathematical modeling should not 
and cannot replace experimental work. A mathematical 
theory can only be truly tested through experiments, 
and discrepancies between the theory and experimental 
results provide guidance about how to revise the theory. 
For example, the ability of mathematical models to make 
valuable predictions about system behavior depends on 
an accurate model of system users, which is generally 
best developed through experimental work.
4.2 Learning from the Social Sciences
Computer scientists cannot develop the mathematical 
foundations of social computing in isolation. Social 
computing systems are fundamentally social. These 
systems cannot be properly modeled or analyzed without 
accounting for the behavior of their human components. 
Much of the literature thus far uses standard models of 
economic agents and corresponding assumptions about 
agent preferences, but a growing literature based on 
experimental work on online platforms suggests that 
human behavior in several online settings might deviate 
from these models [38, 49, 67], and these deviations 
can have significant consequences for how to optimally 
design social computing systems [20, 27].
In order for mathematical foundations to provide 
useful practical results, it is necessary to base it on 
models that better reflect human behavior. This is most 
effectively achieved via a dialog between theoretical 
and experimental and empirical research, with studies 
of human behavior informing mathematical modeling 
choices, as well as mathematical results suggesting the 
most important agent characteristics to understand via 
experimental research. It will be important to understand 
and incorporate relevant research from psychology, 
economics, sociology, and other fields. For example, 
behavioral economics and psychology provide insight into 
how humans respond to incentives. This is no small task. 
The best results will be achieved if computer scientists 
work together with researchers in other fields.
4.3 Generalization
Most of the existing mathematical work on social 
computing focuses on a single application. What does 
the research on prediction market design tell us about 
7recommendation systems or citizen science? Models will 
have the most potential for impact if they incorporate 
reusable components, allowing results to generalize 
to many systems. (This is one motivation for the 
Crowdsourcing Compiler of Section 3.)
A related issue is the lack of consensus and 
understanding of the “core social computing 
problems,” or even if such a set of core problems 
exists. Mathematical theories are typically developed 
with one or more such core problems in mind. Such 
problems should capture challenges that span a wide 
range of applications and be robust to small changes 
in the applications to be sure that they are capturing 
something “real.” Clearly, the identification of such 
problems requires a dialog between practitioners building 
real systems and theoreticians to identify the most 
pressing problems requiring mathematical study.
4.4 Transparency, Interpretability, and Ethical 
Implications
One final challenge to overcome is the potential need 
to make social computing algorithms and models 
transparent and interpretable to the users of social 
computing systems. Users are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and are aware that the algorithms 
employed online impact both their day-to-day user 
experience and their privacy. When faced with the output 
of an algorithm, many will question where this output 
came from and why. It is already difficult to explain to 
users why complex probabilistic algorithms and models 
produce the results that they do, and this will only 
become more difficult as algorithms integrate human 
behavior to a larger extent.
The issue of algorithmic transparency is often tied to 
ethical concerns such as discrimination and fairness. 
Examining and avoiding the unintended consequences 
of opaque decisions made by algorithms is a topic that 
has been gaining interest in the machine learning and 
big data communities.7 Such concerns will undoubtedly 
need to be addressed in the context of social computing 
as well.
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